Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (decided March 6, 1857): once-free slave had no claim to freedom in slave state because he was black (probably the most-abrogated case in Court history, by the Civil War, by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and more) (for some reason Taney did not like Nelson’s original “hands-off” affirmance on narrow grounds and took quill in hand to write a sweeping holding that he imagined would settle the slave issue once and for all — he was 79 and maybe getting feeble) (we all know about the political effect of this disaster, but what about the legal effect? the Court held that black people had no rights -- was every lawsuit brought by a black plaintiff then dismissed for lack of standing? was every black voter thrown off the rolls?)
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (decided March 6, 1819): Congress can establish a national bank, and the states cannot tax it
Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 (decided March 6, 1911): In 1861 West Virginia broke away from Virginia because it didn’t want to secede and also it wanted to abolish slavery; years later Virginia goes after West Virginia for its share of Virginia’s public debt (public projects in those areas). No statute of limitations on suits between states, evidently; suit wasn’t brought until 1906. Holmes here holds mostly for Virginia but adjusts the amount based on post-Civil War developments and refuses to let the states further nickel-and-dime things in front of the Special Master. “This case is one that calls for forbearance upon both sides. Great states have a temper superior to that of private litigants, and it is to be hoped that enough has been decided for patriotism, the fraternity of the Union, and mutual consideration to bring it to an end.”
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206 (decided March 6, 2017): Remember “12 Angry Men”, and Juror #10’s (Ed Begley) racist diatribe? Courts in general hate to undo a verdict based on juror misconduct, but here, where a juror made statements during deliberations showing racial bias, the Court sends the case back to the trial court to see if Sixth Amendment fair trial right was violated. (I’m one of those trial lawyers who asks the jurors after the verdict whether they want to stay behind and give me their impressions. The trial attorney did that here, found this out from one of the other jurors.)
Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (decided March 6, 2000): Most criminal defense attorneys don’t let their clients testify. This case shows why. The prosecutor told the jury that sitting there day by day, hearing witnesses, allowed defendant to tailor his testimony when he got to the stand. The Court says this is o.k.; it did not violate his right to confrontation, or his right to an impartial trial, or his right to testify on his own behalf.
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (decided March 6, 1989): striking down on Fourteenth Amendment grounds Virgin Islands rule that admits attorneys to its bar only if they’ve lived there a year and promise to stay there (“no, I’d rather freeze half the year in the Chicago, stuck in traffic jams!”)
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (decided March 6, 1972): rule of Coleman v. Alabama, 1970 (there must be a preliminary hearing and counsel must be present at it) is not retroactive
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (decided March 6, 1961): police in adjacent consenting house bored “spike mike” into shared wall until it hit defendant’s vent, which acted as a megaphone, and clearly heard conversations of gambling; this was “search” needing warrant (in 1985 our crisis center moved into a basement space needing ventilation; I was about to put in a duct leading to the outside until someone pointed out it would broadcast our clients’ secrets out into the street)
Bay v. Merrill & Ring Logging Co., 243 U.S. 40 (decided March 6, 1917): railroad employee could not sue under Federal Employers’ Liability Act; railroad’s in-state logging (Puget Sound) not involved in interstate commerce even though logs later sold to customer in California
Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15 (decided March 6, 1917): cotton futures contract made in New York could be sued on in Texas federal court; Texas statute prohibiting such contracts on its terms applied only to contracts made in-state
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