United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (decided March 27, 1876): The Constitution does not guarantee a right to peacefully assemble, nor a right to bear arms; it merely prevents those rights from being encroached on by the federal government. Neither are “fundamental” (i.e. preexisting) rights, and can therefore be restricted by States. (Or so it was held. Typically leaden opinion by Waite, dismissing Louisiana indictment arising out of the Colfax massacre, where about 100 black people were killed in a dispute over a state election; Waite cites supposed vagueness of indictment, and holds that Fourteenth Amendment and Enforcement Act of 1870 apply only to state conduct, not conduct of private individuals.)
Lorenzo v. SEC, 587 U.S. — (decided March 27, 2019): dissemination (not just creation) of false or misleading statements violates securities laws (upholding SEC sanctions against banker who had emailed potential investors as to the upside of an offer to a client but not the downside)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (decided March 27, 1985): issue of fact as to whether shooting of fleeing suspect after burglary in unoccupied house was a “reasonable” seizure under the Fourth Amendment; striking down Tennessee statute allowing deadly force against nondangerous suspect
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (decided March 27, 1996): Florida has Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by Indian tribe to compel negotiations under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; also state officials don’t have enough discretion under the Act to be exposed to Ex parte Young liability
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (decided March 27, 1979): stopping car and checking license is unreasonable Fourth Amendment search/seizure unless “articulable suspicion” of violation of law (marijuana smelled and found during stop was suppressed) (though “less intrusive” “spot checks” are o.k.; in his concurrence Blackmun, joined by Powell, “assumes that the Court’s reservation also includes other not purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a given point)”; four years later in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 1983, where the Court held for no standing, Marshall in dissent pointed out that under that decision “a policy of shooting one out of ten suspects” would evade federal court review)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (decided March 27, 1939): striking down on vagueness grounds statute criminalizing “being a gangster” (known to be a gang member, knowing gang members, etc.)
Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (decided March 27, 2013): Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity for any act by law enforcement officers while in the course of their employment, not just while arresting, investigating, etc. (can sue for sexual assault by federal prison guards)
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (decided March 27, 2013): Court reverses class certification because trial court did not allow defendant to rebut plaintiff’s expert showing of increase in cable prices due to Comcast’s anticompetitive activities (which was not tailored to the only theory allowed by the trial court — that Comcast’s gobbling up of local providers prevented new competitors from entering market); 5 - 4 decision; the dissent by Ginsburg and Breyer argues that Court’s holding restricts class certification to cases where plaintiffs can already show they will win the case (that’s my impression also).
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (decided March 27, 1996): conspiracy to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. §846) was lesser included offense within continuing criminal enterprise (§848); defendant can’t be convicted of both
United States v. First City National Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (decided March 27, 1967): under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, trial court in lawsuit challenging merger should not have given any deference to the decision of the Comptroller of the Currency allowing merger
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