Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (decided January 29, 1968): I didn’t know until I read this case that something can be against the law and still be taxed. “Wagering” (handling bets) is (or was) an example. Not only did (do?) “wagerers” have to pay taxes, they were required to register and publicly post their licenses. Defendant here refused to do any of this, citing the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court agrees, noting that the information gathered by the statutory scheme is used by prosecutors, and holding that asserting the privilege is a complete defense. (In other words, I admit that I broke the law and therefore you can’t prosecute me.) The Court notes “different” circumstances where “a taxpayer is not confronted by substantial hazards of self-incrimination”, but I can’t imagine how that would ever be true if the taxed activity is illegal.
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (decided January 29, 1968): Decided the same day as Marchetti, with a similar situation. Small firearms, i.e., capable of being concealed, were presumed to be used “principally by persons engaged in unlawful activities”, and therefore were subject to special taxation and registration requirements. Also included were small firearms actually constructed by the owner. Ownership of an unregistered firearm is a criminal offense. (The statutes, 26 U.S.C. §§5841 and 5845, are still in force.) The Court here holds that one cannot register a small firearm without incriminating oneself, because the registration requirements include providing personal information and whether he has ever been convicted of a crime; therefore it reverses a conviction for ownership of an unregistered firearm as defined.
United States ex rel. Lowe v. Fisher, 223 U.S. 95 (decided January 29, 1912): Descendants of former slave of Cherokees had no claim because he did not return to reservation (and get his allotted land) within six-month deadline set by Court of Claims. The opinion has an interesting historical discussion of tribes’ attitudes towards being forced to give up their slaves; whether freed black people should have the same rights as tribesmen; and how Congress dealt with the issue over the years.
Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (decided January 29, 1968): Chicago “censor” process violated First Amendment because 1) gave the censor too much time to decide whether a film could be shown and 2) did not provide for prompt judicial review (the films, “Rent-a-Girl” and “Body of a Female”, can be found online; they’re what “Carnival of Souls” would look like if filmed by a sex-obsessed 14-year-old boy)
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (decided January 29, 1968): Owner of car whose insurer was being sued in connection with accident didn’t have “absolute, substantive right” to be joined as defendant because joining him was “infeasible” due to destroying diversity and therefore he was not an “indispensable party” under FRCP 19. What?? (my Civ Pro professor complimented Harlan’s analysis, but my Complex Litigation prof called this case “incomprehensible”, which made me feel better, because this logic seems circular to me, even 34 years later)
Comments